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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SCHWARTZ, Senior District Judge 
 
This appeal addresses the propriety of the appointment of 
counsel for a debtor in possession, where the debtor 
transferred restricted securities to its counsel in payment 
for pre-petition services on the eve of its filing for 
bankruptcy. The United States Trustee ("Trustee") and the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
*Hon. Murray M. Schwartz, Senior United States District Judge for the 
District of Delaware, sitting by designation. 
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Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") contend the 
law firm of Robinson, St. John, & Wayne ("RSW") was 
disqualified from serving as counsel for the debtor, First 
Jersey Securities, because it held an interest adverse to the 
debtor's estate by reason of the transfer to it of the 
restricted securities. The Bankruptcy Court and the United 
States District Court for the District of New Jersey held the 
debtor could retain RSW as counsel. Because counsel 
received a preference under Section 547 of the Bankruptcy 
Code, 11 U.S.C. S 547, we will reverse and remand. 
 
I. 
 
First Jersey Securities, Inc.1 (the "debtor" or "First 
Jersey") filed a voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 
11 of the Bankruptcy Code on August 7, 1995. 11 U.S.C. 
S 101 et seq. This action was prompted after the SEC 
prevailed in a securities fraud action against First Jersey 
and its 100% shareholder, Robert Brennan, and obtained 
an order for them to disgorge $75 million in illegal 
proceeds. S.E.C. v. First Jersey Securities, Inc., 890 F. Supp. 
1185 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), aff 'd in part, rev'd in part, 101 F.3d 
1450 (2d Cir. 1996). Obtaining that order left the SEC as 
the largest unsecured creditor of the debtor. 
 
Concurrent with the filing of the petition, the debtor filed 
an application pursuant to S 327(a) of the Bankruptcy Code 
to retain RSW as its counsel. First Jersey owed thefirm 
approximately $389,000 for legal services rendered prior to 
the filing for bankruptcy primarily for work performed in 
the securities fraud litigation.2 On the same day of its 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. First Jersey was a discount broker-dealer specializing in the 
underwriting, trading, and distribution of low-priced securities. The 
company was found to have committed securities fraud by selling 
securities to its customers at prices that included excessive markups, 
and by failing to disclose to its customers thefirm's control over the 
respective securities' trading markets. 
 
2. Lead counsel for RSW was Walter Greenhalgh. RSW subsequently 
disbanded, and its successor firm, St. John & Wayne was substituted as 
counsel. Later, Duane, Morris & Heckscher was substituted as counsel 
when Greenhalgh joined that firm. At all times, Greenhalgh has been 
lead counsel for the debtor in possession. 
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Chapter 11 filing, the debtor transferred 200,001 shares of 
unregistered restricted stock in International Thoroughbred 
Breeders, Inc. ("ITB") to RSW.3 This stock was to be 
liquidated by RSW, with payments to be made in the 
following manner: $200,000 as a retainer for representation 
in the bankruptcy proceedings; $250,000 for payment on 
firm invoices for representation in the securities fraud 
litigation, with any excess to be returned to the debtor. The 
$250,000 was to be considered full payment for the 
$389,327 due for pre-petition services. The firm waived the 
remaining pre-petition balance, thereby eliminating itself as 
a creditor of the debtor. Apparently, shares in ITB were the 
debtor's only meaningful resource, as its bankruptcy 
petition listed only $22,367 in other assets. Ultimately, 
RSW found a buyer for the shares, and transferred all of 
the ITB stock for $600,003. RSW kept $450,000 and 
returned the remainder to the debtor. While the transfer of 
stock was noted in both the debtor's petition and counsel's 
petition to be retained as counsel, neither party disclosed 
the payment was made within 90 days of the debtor filing 
for bankruptcy. 
 
On August 11, 1995, four days after the filing of the 
petition, the Trustee, joined by the SEC three days later, 
objected to the appointment of RSW as counsel, arguing the 
firm was not "disinterested" as is required by the 
Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. S 327(a). The Trustee and the 
SEC (collectively referred to as "SEC") maintained the 
transfer of ITB restricted stock was a preferential payment, 
thereby disqualifying RSW from acting as counsel for the 
debtor because it held an interest adverse to the estate. 
RSW, in response, submitted a certification asserting the 
payment was made in the ordinary course of business, was 
not preferential, and was deemed timely payment. It did not 
disclose the date of the stock transfer. What occurred in the 
Bankruptcy Court and District Court is set forth below. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Because the ITB shares were unregistered, they could only be sold 
under an exemption provided by Section 4 of the Securities Act. 15 
U.S.C. S 77d. 
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A. Bankruptcy Court 
 
On August 24, 1995, the Bankruptcy Court held a 
hearing on the debtor's application to retain RSW as its 
counsel. The SEC contended the payment of RSW's pre- 
petition claim was a voidable preference under the 
Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. S 547(b),4 which is a cause for 
disqualification under Section 327(a).5  During the hearing, 
RSW acknowledged the stock transfer took place within the 
90 day preference period, but contended it was made in the 
ordinary course of business, and not made in exchange for 
an "antecedent debt". Counsel explained the $250,000 
payment was for a series of invoices from January through 
May 1995, as well as for work done in June and July of 
that year. He stated, 
 
       [T]he normal course of doing business with the debtor 
       for at least the past 12 months and probably going 
       back a year and a half or two years, would be a method 
       where we would generate an invoice, we would then 
       submit a group of invoices after several months, . .. 
       submit that to the debtor, discuss with the debtor a 
       method of payment, and the debtor would make 
       payment on those groups of invoices. 
 
Bankruptcy Docket No. 30, August 24, 1995 Hearing at 31. 
 
The Bankruptcy Court approved the debtor's application 
to retain RSW from the bench on August 24, 1995 and 
subsequently issued a written opinion. In re Brennan, 187 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Section 547(b) of the Code permits a trustee to avoid certain pre- 
bankruptcy transfers as "preferences" where the debtor transfers 
property to a creditor for an antecedent debt made within 90 days before 
filing for bankruptcy. In re Molded Acoustical Products, Inc., 18 F.3d 
217, 
217 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
5. Section 327(a) provides: "[T]he trustee, with the court's approval, may 
employ one or more attorneys . . . that do not hold or represent an 
interest adverse to the estate, and that are disinterested persons, to 
represent or assist the trustee in carrying out the trustee's duties under 
this title." 11 U.S.C. S 327(a). Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. S 1107, the debtor 
in possession has the right to seek the employment of professionals 
subject to S 327(a). If, in fact, the $250,000 payment for pre-petition 
services was a preference, RSW would not be a "disinterested person" 
within the meaning of the statute. 
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B.R. 135 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1995). That Court held the SEC 
did not present a prima facie case that RSW received a 
voidable preference under Section 547(b) of the Bankruptcy 
Code. Specifically, the Bankruptcy Court found there was 
no prima facie showing of a transfer to "satisfy an 
antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such transfer 
was made", as is required under S 547(b)(2).6 In re Brennan, 
187 B.R. at 153. The Court reasoned a debt is not"owed" 
within the meaning of the statute until payment is past 
due, even if the debt is antecedent. It accepted RSW's 
assertion that the debtor's financial obligation to the firm 
was not past due, and consequently the payment was 
deemed timely. 
 
In the alternative, the Court found the transfer of stock, 
even if a preference, was not a voidable preference because 
it was a payment made in the ordinary course of business 
under Section 547(c). If the transfer was incurred and made 
in the ordinary course of business between the parties, and 
made according to ordinary business terms, then the 
transfer cannot be avoided by the debtor's estate. 11 U.S.C. 
S 547(c)(2).7 In addition, the Court dismissed the SEC's 
claim that the debtor and counsel failed to disclose 
adequately the details of the pre-petition transfer of the 
stock. The Bankruptcy Court concluded, "The U.S. Trustee 
and the SEC therefore failed to establish that the payment 
in question is probably an avoidable preference. The mere 
accusation that it could be avoidable is not sufficient to 
disqualify Robinson." In re Brennan, 187 B.R. at 154. 
 
B. District Court 
 
The SEC and Trustee appealed the decision of the 
Bankruptcy Court to the United States District Court for 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Section 547(b)(2) provides that "the trustee may avoid any transfer of 
an interest of the debtor in property . . . for or on account of an 
antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such transfer was made." 
 
7. Section 547(c)(2) provides that a "trustee may not avoid under this 
section a transfer . . . to the extent that such transfer was -- (A) in 
payment of a debt incurred by the debtor in the ordinary course of 
business or financial affairs of the debtor and the transferee; (B) made 
in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the debtor and 
the transferee; and (C) made according to ordinary business terms." 
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the District of New Jersey, contending the Bankruptcy 
Court erred in finding the law firm was not disqualified 
under S 327(a). The District Court filed a memorandum and 
order affirming the Bankruptcy Court's decision. In re First 
Jersey Securities, Inc., No. 95-5455 (D. N.J.filed April 9, 
1998). 
 
The Court agreed with the Bankruptcy Court that the 
transfer of ITB stock did not constitute a preference under 
S 547(b), and therefore, RSW should not be disqualified. 
The District Court also concluded the stock transfer was 
not made on account of an antecedent debt owed by the 
debtor before the transfer was made. Finally, the Court 
declined to address the Bankruptcy Court's conclusion that 
the stock transfer payment was made in the ordinary 
course of business. 
 
II. 
 
The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
S 158(a) to review the Bankruptcy Court'sfinal order 
approving the debtor's application for retention of counsel. 
This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 158(d) to 
review the District Court's final order. United States Trustee 
v. Price Waterhouse, 19 F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
Our standard of review of a District Court's 
determination on appeal from a Bankruptcy Court decision 
has been articulated on numerous occasions. "As an 
appellate court twice removed from the primary tribunal, 
we review both the factual and legal determinations of the 
district court for error." Universal Minerals, Inc. v. C.A. 
Hughes & Co., 669 F.2d 98, 101-2 (3d Cir. 1981). Our 
vantage point is identical to that of the District Court, "so 
we review the bankruptcy court's findings by the standards 
the district court should employ to determine whether the 
district court erred in its review." Id. at 102. Accordingly, 
the Bankruptcy Court's findings of fact are reviewable for 
clear error. In re Continental Airlines, 125 F.3d 120, 128 (3d 
Cir. 1997). Legal determinations are subject to plenary 
review. Id. The Bankruptcy Court's exercise of discretion is 
reviewed for abuse thereof. In re Engel, 124 F.3d 567, 571 
(3d Cir. 1997). 
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III. 
 
The SEC urges this Court to reverse the District Court's 
decision approving the retention of RSW as counsel for the 
debtor. It argues the Court erred in finding the stock 
transfer was not a voidable preference under 11 U.S.C. 
S 547, and that error led it to conclude RSW was qualified 
to serve as counsel to the debtor under 11 U.S.C.S 327. 
The SEC also urges the transfer of the ITB restricted stock 
was not made in the ordinary course of business as 
outlined in 11 U.S.C. S 547(c)(2). Finally, the SEC asserts 
the District Court erred in finding RSW's disclosures 
concerning the stock transfer payments were sufficient 
under S 327(a). Because we conclude the stock transfer was 
a preferential payment not made in the ordinary course of 
business, we need not address whether RSW adequately 
disclosed the stock payments to the Bankruptcy Court. 
 
A. Stock Transfer as Preferential Payment 
 
Section 327(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides for the 
trustee (or the debtor in possession), with the Court's 
approval, to employ attorneys "that do not hold or represent 
an interest adverse to the estate," and that are 
"disinterested persons." 11 U.S.C. S 327(a); 11 U.S.C. 
S1107. In order for counsel to be retained, "counsel must 
`not hold or represent an interest adverse to the estate' and 
must be a `disinterested person.' " In re BH&P Inc., 949 
F.2d 1300, 1314 (3d Cir. 1991) (citing In re Star 
Broadcasting, Inc., 81 B.R. 835, 838 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1988)). 
 
A "disinterested person" is defined as one who does not 
have an interest materially adverse to the interest of the 
estate, by reason of any direct or indirect relationship with 
the debtor, or for any other reason. 11 U.S.C. S 101(14)(e). 
The standards regarding adverse interests underS 327(a) 
are outlined in In Re Marvel Entertainment Group, Inc., 140 
F.3d 463, 476 (3d Cir. 1998). In that case, we held: 
 
       (1) Section 327(a), as well as 327(c), imposes a per se 
       disqualification as trustee's counsel of any attorney 
       who has an actual conflict of interest; 
 
       (2) the district court may within its discretion-- 
       pursuant to S 327(a) and consistent with 327(c) -- 
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       disqualify an attorney who has a potential conflict of 
       interest and 
 
       (3) the district court may not disqualify an attorney on 
       the appearance of conflict alone. 
 
Id. A Court may consider an interest adverse to the estate 
when counsel has "a competing economic interest tending 
to diminish estate values or to create a potential or actual 
dispute in which the estate is a rival claimant." In re 
Caldor, Inc., 193 B.R. 165, 171 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996) 
(where Trustee objected to retention of counsel by official 
committee of unsecured creditors in Chapter 11 case); In re 
Star Broadcasting, Inc., 81 B.R. 835, 838 (Bank. D.N.J. 
1988) (where Bankruptcy Court held law firm held actual 
conflict of interest in representing both debtors in 
possession). 
 
In summary, S 327(a) mandates disqualification when 
there is an actual conflict of interest, allows for it when 
there is a potential conflict, and precludes it based solely 
on an appearance of conflict. In the situation where the 
debtor in possession seeks to retain counsel, as is the case 
here, the Code provides, "[A] person is not disqualified for 
employment under S 327 of this title by a debtor in 
possession solely because of such person's employment by 
representation of the debtor before the commencement of 
the case." 11 U.S.C. S 1107(b). Where there is an actual 
conflict of interest, however, disqualification is mandatory. 
In re Marvel Entertainment Group, 140 F.3d at 476. A 
preferential transfer to RSW would constitute an actual 
conflict of interest between counsel and the debtor, and 
would require the firm's disqualification. In re BH&P, 949 
F.2d at 1316-1317. 
 
The Bankruptcy Code's avoidable preference provision, 
11 U.S.C. S 547(b), allows a bankruptcy trustee to recover 
certain transfers a debtor made prior to filing a petition in 
bankruptcy. The trustee must show that the transfer was: 
 
       1) to or for the benefit of a creditor; 
 
       2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by  the 
       debtor before such transfer was made; 
 
       3) made while the debtor was insolvent; 
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       4) made -- on or within 90 days before the date of the 
       filing of the petition; . . . 
 
       5) that enables such creditor to receive more than 
       such creditor would receive if -- 
 
       A) the case were a case under Chapter 7 of this ti tle; 
 
       B) the transfer had not been made; and 
 
       C) such creditor received payment of such debt to 
       the extent provided by the provisions of this title 
 
11 U.S.C. S 547(c)(2). The Bankruptcy Court and District 
Court held the SEC did not make a prima facie showing the 
stock transfer likely satisfied the requirement that the 
transfer be "for or on account of an antecedent debt owed 
by the debtor before such transfer was made." 11 U.S.C. 
S 547(b)(2). The Courts below found all other elements of 
Section 547(b) were established, a conclusion with which 
we are in accord. 
 
The Bankruptcy Court reasoned that not only must the 
debt be antecedent, but also the payment of a debt must be 
past due, as a prerequisite for establishing a voidable 
preference under S 547(b)(2). RSW certified the transfer of 
the securities was in the ordinary course of business 
dealings between the two parties, and was deemed timely 
payment. It further represented the invoices submitted by 
the firm did not constitute a final bill of an amount owed to 
the firm. Rather, the firm would negotiate with the debtor 
over several months worth of invoices, and adjust the bill 
accordingly. An invoice was not finalized until after 
negotiations. With respect to the final bill with First Jersey, 
the debtor agreed to pay $250,000 for legal services 
rendered from January to July 1995 almost simultaneously 
with the conclusion of negotiations over the final bill. The 
parties agreed the $250,000 was in settlement of the 
invoices presented by RSW for legal work performed from 
January to May 1995 (which totaled $314,327), as well as 
for work performed in June and July 1995 for which RSW 
had not yet generated an invoice ($75,000). RSW thus 
argues the payment was made before the debt was actually 
past due. The Bankruptcy Court agreed, reasoning the debt 
was not due prior to the time the payment was made. The 
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District Court concurred with this conclusion under the 
same legal reasoning. 
 
The District Court's legal interpretation of S 547(b)(2) is 
reviewed de novo. Under the language of the statute, in 
order to constitute a preferential payment, First Jersey 
must have owed an antecedent "debt" to RSW, and that 
debt must have been incurred "before the transfer was 
made." 11 U.S.C. S 547(b)(2). The Bankruptcy Code defines 
a debt as a "liability on a claim." 11 U.S.C.S 101(12). In 
turn, the Code defines a claim broadly. A "claim" means: (A) 
right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to 
judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, 
matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, 
equitable, secured, or unsecured. 11 U.S.C. S 101(5). Under 
this broad definition of claim, "all legal obligations of the 
debtor, no matter how remote or contingent, will be able to 
be dealt with in the bankruptcy case." Senate Report at 22, 
1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 5787, 5808. In 
addition, as debt is defined as a liability on a claim, it is 
coextensive with the definition of a claim, and both are 
construed broadly. Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare v. 
Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 110 S.Ct. 2126, 109 L.Ed.2d 588 
(1990). It follows "when a creditor has a claim against a 
debtor -- even if the claim is unliquidated, unfixed, or 
contingent -- the debtor has incurred a debt to the 
creditor." In re Energy Cooperative, Inc., 832 F.2d 997, 1001 
(7th Cir. 1987). 
 
The SEC contends First Jersey incurred a debt to RSW 
when the law firm performed legal services on the debtor's 
behalf. We agree. Courts which have considered this issue 
have concluded, consistent with the statutory definitions, 
that an antecedent debt owed by the debtor occurs when a 
right to payment arises -- even if the claim is not fixed, 
liquidated, or matured. See 11 U.S.C. S 101(5); In re 
Bennett Funding Group, Inc., 220 B.R. 739, 742 (2d Cir. 
B.A.P. 1998) (debt occurs "when the debtor previously 
obtained a property interest in the consideration provided 
by the creditor that gave rise to the debt"). The right to 
payment generally arises when the debtor obtains the goods 
or services. See, e.g., Id; In re Futoran, 76 F.3d 265, 267 
(9th Cir. 1996); In re Cybermech, Inc., 13 F.3d 818, 821 
(4th Cir. 1994); In re Energy Co-op, Inc., 832 F.2d at 1001. 
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Under this reasoning, RSW had a claim at the time it 
performed legal services for First Jersey. Its claim was 
"antecedent" for purposes of Section 547(b)(2). The payment 
of $250,000 from the sale of ITB stock was to settle the 
debt owed by First Jersey for past legal services rendered 
between January and July 1995. We agree with our sister 
circuits and other courts that legal claims arise when the 
legal services are performed, not when the bill itself is 
presented to the client. See, e.g., In re Florence Tanners, 
Inc., 209 B.R. 439, 447 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1997); In re 
Investment Bankers, Inc., 136 B.R. 1008, 1018 (D. Colo. 
1989), aff'd, 4 F.3d 1556 (10th Cir. 1993). 
 
In In re Florence Tanners, an attorney claimed he did not 
receive a preferential transfer because he received payment 
before he had sent an invoice for his services. The Court 
disagreed, and held "a debt for legal services arises when 
the services are performed, not when the subsequent 
invoice is issued." 209 B.R. at 447. Similarly, the 
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel in In re Bennett Funding Group 
concluded that, since a law firm which provided legal 
services "had a claim, mature or unmatured, that it could 
then assert against a debtor's bankruptcy estate if payment 
was not made at the time a petition was filed . . . the debt 
was `antecedent' for purposes of Section 547(b)(2)." 220 
B.R. 739, 742 (B.A.P. 2d Cir. 1998). 
 
The policies underlying the preference section in the 
bankruptcy statute cry out for the conclusion that a debt 
arises when legal services are provided, not when a law firm 
issues an invoice. The overriding intent in enactingS 547(b) 
was to promote equal distribution among a debtor's 
creditors. The preference section discourages creditors from 
racing to the courthouse to dismember the debtor during 
its slide into bankruptcy, and it furthers the policy of equal 
distribution among similarly situated creditors. 5 Collier on 
Bankruptcy, S 547-9; 1978 Code Cong. & Admin. News 
5787, 6138. 
 
The Bankruptcy Court's reasoning that a debt is not 
owed until payment is past due is not found in the 
preference statute, 11 U.S.C. S 547. Its absence is readily 
understandable. If the Bankruptcy Court's conclusions 
were permitted to stand, the preference provision of the 
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Bankruptcy Code would be largely vitiated. The Bankruptcy 
Court's judicial gloss would allow creditors to retain a pre- 
petition payment simply by asserting that the payment was 
"timely," as was done by RSW. Pronouncing a payment is 
"timely" does not make it so. Moreover, such an approach 
would lead to inequality among similarly situated creditors, 
and allow for both strategic behavior and collusion by 
creditors to secure preferential treatment prior to a debtor 
filing its petition. This approach would "leave to the creditor 
the discretion to determine the date the obligation was 
incurred, creating the possibility not only of inequality of 
treatment of similarly-situated creditors (depending on the 
vagaries of their billing practices), but also the opportunity 
for a particular creditor, who foresees that his debtor is 
approaching bankruptcy, to secure preferential treatment 
for himself by the timing of the bill." Matter of Emerald Oil 
Co., 695 F.2d 833, 837 (5th Cir. 1983). 
 
In this case, the stock transfer resulted in a large 
diminution of the value of the debtor's estate, and a serious 
depletion of assets of the estate available to other creditors. 
Similarly situated creditors were not treated equally. 
Moreover, RSW, as the debtor's counsel, was in a unique 
position to secure preferential treatment for itself-- as it 
knew the debtor was going to file for bankruptcy in the 
imminent future. First Jersey's payment to RSW depleted 
the estate of its only significant asset that would have been 
available to its other creditors. This is the type of payment 
Congress intended the preference section to reach. We have 
no trouble concluding the stock transfer was a preference 
under Section 547 of the Bankruptcy Code. As such, RSW 
had an actual conflict with the debtor and was therefore 
disqualified from serving as counsel under S 327, unless 
payment to it was in the ordinary course of business. 
 
B. Payment in the Ordinary Course of Business 
 
Even if a payment is considered a preference under 
Section 547(b), it may not be subject to avoidance if it was 
made in the ordinary course of business, as defined in 11 
U.S.C. S 547(c). The purpose of Section 547(c) is to leave 
undisturbed normal financial relations between a debtor 
and its creditors, even as a company approaches 
bankruptcy. It protects "recurring, customary credit 
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transactions that are incurred and paid in the ordinary 
course of business of the debtor and the debtor's 
transferee." 5 Collier on Bankruptcy, 547-47. We conclude, 
however, that the debtor's stock transfer to RSW in this 
case was not made in the ordinary course of business 
dealings between the two parties, nor was it made 
according to ordinary business terms. 
 
In reaching the opposite conclusion, the Bankruptcy 
Court concluded the stock transfer was made in the 
ordinary course of business, and was thus acceptable even 
if one concluded the payment constituted a preferential 
transfer under S 547(b). The Court accepted RSW's 
assertion that its ordinary billing procedure with First 
Jersey was to submit a number of invoices after several 
months, and then negotiate the amount and method of 
payment. Counsel explained, "we would go to the debtor 
with the invoices in hand, submit them to the client, 
discuss with the client whether the bills should be 
adjusted, and in most cases they were adjusted downward, 
and then work out some sort of a payment on that 
particular group of invoices." Bankruptcy Docket No. 30 at 
32. 
 
A trustee may not avoid a preferential transfer to the 
extent such transfer was: "(A) in payment of a debt incurred 
by the debtor in the ordinary course of business or 
financial affairs of the debtor and transferee; (B) made in 
the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the 
debtor and transferee; and (C) made according to ordinary 
business terms." 11 U.S.C. S 547(c)(2). The burden is on the 
transferee to satisfy each statutory element by a 
preponderance of the evidence. 11 U.S.C. S 547(g); J.P. Fyfe, 
Inc. of Florida v. Bradco Supply Corp., 891 F.2d 66, 69-70 
(3d Cir. 1989). 
 
It is undisputed the transfer of stock satisfies 
S 547(c)(2)(A) -- the debt was incurred for legal services 
provided by RSW to First Jersey in the normal course of 
business. The conflict arises as to the other two elements. 
The term "ordinary" is not defined in the bankruptcy 
statute. J.P. Fyfe teaches the determination of what is "in 
the ordinary course of business" is subjective, calling for 
the Court to consider whether the transfer was ordinary as 
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between the debtor and the creditor. Factors such as 
timing, the amount and manner in which a transaction was 
paid are considered relevant. In re Yurika Foods Corp., 888 
F.2d 42, 45 (6th Cir. 1989). 
 
Employing these criteria, we conclude the payment was 
not made in the ordinary course of business. The timing of 
the payment to RSW is clearly suspect. The transfer of 
stock was made on the day the debtor filed its petition for 
bankruptcy. RSW did not show that the payment date fit a 
particular practice between the parties. Rather, all the 
record shows is that First Jersey made periodic payments 
during 1994 and 1995. These payments consisted of: 
 
       10/28/94  $300,000 
       12/07/94  $150,000 
       12/22/94  $150,000 
       02/10/95  $150,000 
       03/24/95  $150,000 
       05/31/95  $150,000 
 
We merely note the payment of $250,000 on August 7, 
1995 deviates from the pattern of $150,000 payments from 
December 1994 to May 1995. However, we are very 
troubled by the absence in the record of any explanation for 
why the payment was made on the eve of the debtor'sfiling 
for bankruptcy. As First Jersey's counsel in the securities 
litigation, RSW had to know of the debtor's precarious 
financial position when it accepted restricted securities in 
lieu of cash payment because RSW prepared the 
bankruptcy petition filed on the same day as the stock was 
transferred to it. 
 
The RSW firm also failed to produce any evidence that 
the payment of legal bills by transfer of restricted stock was 
in the ordinary course of business between the parties. 
RSW did not assert it had ever before received payment in 
the form of restricted securities. The stock in question was 
unregistered, and could not be sold publicly. In fact, RSW 
needed to find a sophisticated buyer for the securities -- 
and the shares were not sold until October 19, 1995. It 
defies reason that the Robinson firm would accept payment 
in an illiquid asset unless it knew the debtor was in serious 
financial difficulties and could not pay otherwise. The 
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manner and timing of the payment in the currency of 
restricted ITB stock suggests the transfer was not made in 
the ordinary course of business between the parties. 
 
Moreover, the payment was not made "according to 
ordinary business terms", as is required by S 547(c)(2)(c). 
This phrase has been interpreted as encompassing"the 
practices in which firms similar in some general way to the 
creditor in question engage." In re Molded Acoustical 
Products, Inc., 18 F.3d 217, 224 (3d Cir. 1994)."Only 
dealings so idiosyncratic as to fall outside that broad range 
should be deemed extraordinary and therefore outside the 
scope of subsection C." Id., (citing Matter of Tolona Pizza 
Prods. Corp., 3 F.3d 1029, 1033 (7th Cir. 1993)). This Court 
emphasized, moreover, that "the more cemented [as 
measured by duration] the pre-insolvency relationship 
between the debtor and the creditor, the more the creditor 
will be allowed to vary its credit terms from the industry 
norm yet remain within the safe harbor of S 547(c)(2)." Id. 
at 225. 
 
While this test is deferential, it is not non-existent. The 
general practice of law firms is to receive cash in return for 
services, not restricted securities. See, e.g., In re Florence 
Tanners, Inc., 209 B.R. 439, 448 (Bankr. E.D. Mich 1997) 
(questioning "whether in the ordinary course of the legal 
business, clients pay lawyers with merchandise"). While law 
firms have begun to accept equity positions as payment 
from "start-up" companies with strong growth potential, the 
reasoning in these situations is the expectation by the law 
firm that the stock of the client will appreciate in value. In 
contrast, here the restricted stock is not of a client with 
growth potential, but of a third party. Moreover, the record 
reflects it was common practice for First Jersey to pay RSW 
only in cash. In fact, up until the day the Chapter 11 
petition was filed, there is no evidence in the record that 
First Jersey ever transferred securities, much less restricted 
securities, to RSW as payment for legal services. 
 
Finally, it very much appears that on August 7, 1997, 
First Jersey recognized its need for counsel to shepherd it 
through the chapter 11 proceedings. The obvious choice 
was RSW since it had continuously represented First Jersey 
as its legal troubles mounted. But there was a problem. 
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First Jersey owed RSW a substantial amount of money. 
Turning over the ITB stock to RSW was the only solution, 
especially since RSW represented ITB in the past, and 
presumably was familiar with the company. Be that as it 
may, payment of legal bills in restricted stock as a prelude 
to filing a bankruptcy Chapter 11 petition can hardly be 
construed as a payment "made according to ordinary 
business terms." 
 
Viewed in its totality, it is clear this payment was not 
made in the ordinary course of business. Accordingly, the 
preferential payment was a preference, creating an actual 
conflict of interest, and thus, disqualifying RSW as counsel 
for the debtor.8 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
For the reasons set forth above, we find the District 
Court erred in holding that the stock transfer was not a 
preference under 11 U.S.C. S 547. The stock transfer 
created an actual conflict of interest, and therefore 
disqualification is mandatory. In addition, wefind the 
Bankruptcy Court erred in finding the transfer was exempt 
under S 547(c)(2) as a payment made in the ordinary course 
of business. 
 
Accordingly, we will reverse the District Court's order and 
direct the District Court to remand to the Bankruptcy 
Court with instructions to disqualify RSW and successor 
firms as counsel for First Jersey, and to take such further 
action as is consistent with this opinion.9 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Because we conclude the $250,000 payment constituted a preference, 
and counsel is disqualified, we do not reach the question of whether the 
debtor and RSW adequately disclosed information in RSW's application 
for employment as required by Rule 2014(a) of the Federal Rules of 
Bankruptcy Procedure and 11 U.S.C. S 327. 
 
9. We note the Bankruptcy Court warned RSW at the hearing that if the 
transfer is avoided as to the payment of the pre-petition debt, "[RSW] is 
subject not only to disgorgement of the preference, but also to the 
possible denial or reduction of compensation under Code section 328(c) 
as well." In re Brennan, 187 B.R. at 154. 
 
                                17 
  
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
 
                                18 
